Hong Kong, June 3 (ANI): China has gone all-out to develop and expand the missile inventory of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). Unfortunately, the opaqueness of China's intentions - and its refusal to discuss why it is so dramatically increasing the number of missiles - is causing consternation in both Asia and around the world.

The discovery of two mysterious and sprawling new facilities - likely related to PLARF nuclear forces - in the remote northwest Chinese province of Xinjiang is only deepening those concerns.

In its annual Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, released by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) at the end of May, the authors stated: 'The world is currently on the cusp of a new nuclear-arms race, if not already in the early stages of one, with the Asia-Pacific at its centre.'

The IISS assessed: 'Six of the nine nuclear-armed states have either territory or a substantial military presence in the Asia-Pacific. These states are all modernizing or growing their nuclear arsenals - with China's stockpile expanding in particular.'

The latest Pentagon report on China's military capability, issued in December 2025, predicted the PLA's stockpile of nuclear warheads would continue to grow. It noted, 'China's stockpile of nuclear warheads remained in the low 600s through 2024, reflecting a slower rate of production when compared to previous years. Despite this slowdown, the PLA has continued its massive nuclear expansion.'

It predicted 'the PLA remains on track to have over 1,000 warheads by 2030'. This estimate represents a near fivefold expansion on assessments of Beijing's arsenal as numbering in the 'low 200s' as recently as 2020. The USA assessed that the PLARF currently has 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) available for launch from 550 launchers. There are also 300 intermediate-range ballistic missiles like the DF-26, which can confusingly carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead.

The same report also stated China had 100 DF-31-based ICBMs - likely the DF-31BJ - based at three massive silo fields discovered around five years ago.

The Hami missile field in Xinjiang, near Mongolia, boasts 110 silos. Construction began there in March 2021, and the removal of all protective shelters by August 2022 indicated the silos had reached an advanced stage of construction. Southeast of it in Gansu Province is the Yumen facility with another 120 silos. Its construction began in March 2020, and it is the most mature of China's new silo fields.

Halfway between Yumen and Beijing is the Yulin field with 90 silos. Situated in Inner Mongolia, construction started there in April or May 2021. Altogether, these expansive fields give China a total of 320 silos concentrated in three spread-out areas.

The Pentagon believes China 'has likely loaded more than 100 solid-propellant ICBM missile silos', and that they 'are very likely intended to support early warning counterstrike capability'.

Positioned deep inside China to protect them from American attack, they are designed to give China the ability to strike back with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles against an American first strike. The missiles housed there have sufficient range to reach all the way to the continental USA.

Furthermore, the number of DF-5 ICBM silos is expanding from 18 to around 50.

New silos have been added at Jingxian (631 Brigade), Yueyang (634 Brigade) and Luanchuan (662 Brigade).

There was shock when these three massive silo facilities were unearthed for the first time, but it seems China continues to advance their utility. Reuters, on the basis of recent satellite imagery, recently published a story about two new facilities that lie southwest of the Hami silo field in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. One is 140km away and the other is 230km distant from Hami.

Built over the past six years, the hardened infrastructure at each mysterious site includes more than 80 concrete pads from which mobile truck-based launchers or air defense assets could fire off their missile cargoes, as well as bunkers, communications facilities, satellite dishes and electronic warfare infrastructure.

Each facility centers on an octagon-shaped installation, and there are structures containing barracks for personnel, as well as storage sheds for large PLA vehicles.

These are flanked by fortified bunkers and weapon storage areas, according to Reuter's analysis. Also present are large tent-like structures that may hide launch sites and air defense missile batteries. There are also airfields and railheads to link the new facilities to Hami. Satellite imagery showed that military exercises occurred there in April and May.

Reuters quoted Alexander Neill, an adjunct fellow at Hawaii's Pacific Forum think-tank, who remarked, 'We can see this infrastructure is being built on a grand scale, covering thousands of square kilometers of desert beyond the silo fields.' Depending on their precise purpose, Neill said, 'We're looking at a very considerable enhancement and diversification of China's strategic nuclear deterrent.'

Tong Zhao, a senior fellow in nuclear policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Reuters: 'Taken together, I think there's a real possibility that the octagonal structures and the strange towers are linked to C3 [command, control and communications] as well as maintenance and storage activities related to China's nuclear operations at the Hami ICBM silo site.'

There is a third octagon-shaped facility south of China's Lop Nur nuclear test site, but it is not as well developed as the other two at this point. With pockmarked terrain around it, it might even be acting as a target range.

It is noteworthy that China plans to rely heavily on air defense systems to protect is missile fields. This differs from Russia and the USA, who both depend upon sheer quantities of dispersed silos, as well as their hardened construction, for protection.

Discussing the new sites, Hans Kristensen, Director of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project, told Reuters, 'I've never seen anything quite like it. It's an extraordinary effort.' There obviously remains a lack of complete certainty as to the exact nature of the new facilities. Of course, this is the whole problem with China, because it is so opaque regarding its nuclear capabilities and plans.

Chairman Xi Jinping has deliberately boosted China's nuclear arsenal, as he prioritizes a credible nuclear deterrent against his arch-nemesis the USA. China is thus modernizing the airborne and seaborne legs of its nuclear triad. At its September 2025 Victory Day Parade in Beijing, the PLA debuted the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile carried by H-6N bombers. It also showed off the JL-3 third-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile, which arms Type 094 submarines.

As well as introducing new missiles and snowballing its inventory, the PLA has improved its ability to detect launches of hostile nuclear weapons. According to US officials, China has 'probably made progress on its attempts to achieve an early-warning counterstrike capability, similar to launch on warning, where warning of a missile strike enables a counterstrike launch before an enemy first strike can detonate. China likely will continue to refine and train on this capability throughout the rest of the decade.'

It is thought the PLA can detect an ICBM launch within 90 seconds, and send an alert to a command center within 3-4 minutes. This is sufficient warning time for China to fire off a retaliatory barrage before it is struck itself.

China launched two additional Huoyan-1 satellites in 2024-25. The PLA also possesses several ground-based, large, phased-array radars to support its early-warning posture. These would corroborate launches picked up by satellites. In December 2024, China launched several ICBMs from a training center in quick succession, 'indicating the ability to rapidly launch multiple silo-based ICBMs,' the Pentagon report asserted.

China maintains a policy of 'no first use' when it comes to nuclear weapons, meaning it promises never to be the first to utilize nuclear weapons. Naturally, it is willing to strike back against anyone who attacks it first, though.

For the first time since 1980, China launched an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean in September 2024, 'probably to practice a wartime nuclear deterrence operation during peacetime and validate its ability to deliver a nuclear weapon to full range,' according to the US Department of War. The DF-31 was fired from the northern part of Hainan Island, and it flew 11,000km before splashing down near French Polynesia.

The Pentagon stated, 'The PLA views ICBM launches, including into broad ocean areas during crisis or conflict, as an option for medium-to-high-intensity nuclear deterrence operations. The September 2024 launch probably enabled the PLA to train on the procedures and tactics for this type of operation during peacetime.'

As well as long-range ICBMs, the US Department of War believes the PLA is pursuing nuclear weapons with a yield below 10 kilotons. The Pentagon mentioned: 'Such weapons address long-held PLA desires to be able to conduct limited nuclear counterstrikes against military targets and control nuclear escalation. Of China's currently fielded systems, the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile and the H-6N's air-launched ballistic missile are both highly precise theater weapons that would be well suited for delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon.'

Despite - or perhaps because of - all of Beijing's investment in nuclear weapons and missiles, the PLARF was treated as a corrupt organization. Its top leadership was decimated by Xi's anti-graft campaigns: victims included the PLARF commander, deputy commander, chief of staff members, a top engineer and senior figures in state- owned defense companies. This 'is very likely creating reverberations within China's nuclear forces and may be raising questions among leadership about force readiness,' the Pentagon noted.

This winnowing process continues, for in late February this year, the 21st session of the 14th National People's Congress voted to remove Major General Yang Guang, Commander of the PLARF's 64th Base, from his post.

Xi replaced disgraced figures with officers from other services like the navy and air force. The USA assessed: 'The ongoing anticorruption campaign could have short-term effects on readiness, while potentially setting the stage for long-term PLA improvements overall.'

Elsewhere, China has been constructing two CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder reactors at Xiapu in Fujian Province. The first began testing in 2023, but the second is not online yet. Once they are functioning, these reactors will re-establish China's ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

China remains extremely opaque about its nuclear weapons build-up. Therefore, as the IISS noted, 'The United States, as well as its non-nuclear-armed allies Australia, Japan and South Korea, are under pressure to respond to China's and North Korea's growing nuclear-weapons capabilities. Any regional crisis will raise the risk of nuclear use, whether over the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea or on the Korean Peninsula.'

The Pentagon believes 'Beijing probably increasingly seeks to use nuclear deterrence to more broadly deter and limit adversary military involvement in a conventional conflict'. This adds ambiguity and risk of escalation in any confrontation with the USA over a Taiwan contingency.

This was echoed by the IISS. It concluded, 'The salience of nuclear weapons has grown in many of these states' national-security strategies. Beijing, with designs on Taiwan, has watched Russia's attempted full-scale invasion of Ukraine closely, particularly as Moscow attempted to use nuclear threats to create hesitation among Kyiv's partners in providing weapons and support.'

It therefore warned, 'Unfortunately, there remain few legal arrangements, tools and opportunities to restrain nuclear rivalries.' (ANI)